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ABSTRACT
Cross-app collaboration via inter-component communication
is a fundamental mechanism on Android. Although it brings
the benefits such as functionality reuse and data sharing, a
threat called component hijacking is also introduced. By hi-
jacking a vulnerable component in victim apps, an attack
app can escalate its privilege for originally prohibited op-
erations. Many prior studies have been performed to un-
derstand and mitigate this issue, but component hijacking
remains a serious open problem in the Android ecosystem
due to no effective defense deployed in the wild.
In this paper, we present our vision on practically defend-
ing against component hijacking in Android apps. First,
we argue that to fundamentally prevent component hijack-
ing, we need to switch from the previous mindset (i.e., per-
forming system-level control or repackaging vulnerable apps
after they are already released) to a more proactive version
that aims to help security-inexperienced developers make se-
cure components in the first place. To this end, we propose
to embed into apps a secure component library (SecComp),
which performs in-app mandatory access control on behalf
of app components. An important factor for SecComp to be
effective is that we find it is possible to devise a set of prac-
tical in-app policies to stop component hijacking. Further-
more, we allow developers design custom policies, beyond
our by-default generic policies, to support more fine-grained
access control. We have overcome challenges to implement
a preliminary SecComp prototype, which stops component
hijacking with very low performance overhead. We hope the
future research that fully implements our vision can eventu-
ally help real-world apps get rid of component hijacking.
1. INTRODUCTION
Android has been the dominant player in recent years’
smartphone markets. On Android, different apps are al-
lowed to collaborate with each other via inter-component
communication [36]. Although such flexible cross-app col-
laboration brings the benefits such as functionality reuse and
data sharing, a threat called component hijacking [44] is also
introduced. By hijacking a vulnerable component in victim
apps, an attack app can bypass Android sandbox and esca-
late its privilege [33], causing confused deputy problems [40]
such as permission misuse [39], data manipulation [44], and
content leaks [64].
To mitigate component hijacking, many approaches have
been proposed. One major line of the research [51, 38, 34,
29, 30, 28, 42, 54, 31, 55] is to modify or extend Android
operating system so that inter-component communication
could be supervised. The other direction [62] is to patch
app binaries by performing app repackaging [61, 63]. Both
are useful if they could be deployed in the wild. But reality is
harsh: nearly no proposal1 has been integrated into Android
or adopted by Google Play, probably due to the compatibil-
ity and performance concerns. For example, the repackaging
approach violates Android’s signature-based app verification
and thus is not favorable by app markets and developers
who own source codes. Consequently, component hijacking
remains a serious open problem in the Android ecosystem.
In this paper, we try to provide a new perspective for the
research community to reconsider how to practically defend
against component hijacking. We find that neither earlier
proposals consider the problem from developers’ perspective;
they are either from the OS or the app market’s perspec-
tives. However, to fundamentally prevent component hijack-
ing, we do need a more proactive mindset that aims to help
security-inexperienced developers make secure components
in the first place. To this end, we propose to embed into
apps a secure component library (SecComp), which performs
in-app mandatory access control on behalf of app compo-
nents. Compared to the traditional secure development edu-
cation, the SecComp solution is systematic, mandatory, and
low-cost. Moreover, by leveraging automatic code rewriting
techniques, we expect that SecComp could be easily adopted
by developers to produce security-enhanced apps which are
resistant to component hijacking.
An important enabling factor for SecComp to work is
that we find it is possible to devise a set of practical in-
app policies to stop component hijacking. By analyzing the
root causes of different hijacking attacks, we have derived
six generic mandatory access control policies for SecComp
to enforce. In addition, for cases with no fixed patterns,
we propose to leverage user-driven access control to handle
them. Furthermore, we allow developers design custom poli-
cies, beyond our by-default generic policies, to support more
fine-grained access control.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first introduce the threat model in §2, followed by the design
of SecComp in §3. In §4, we present a SecComp prototype
implementation and evaluate it in §5. Related works are
outlined in §6, and finally we conclude in §7.
1Only SEAndroid [54] was adopted to replace the Linux UID-
based sandbox with the SELinux-confined sandbox [16].
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Figure 1: The threat model of component hijacking.
2. THREAT MODEL
Figure 1 presents the threat model of component hijacking
on Android. The adversary is a caller app, and the victim is
a callee app that has certain capabilities or owns some sen-
sitive data. A necessary condition of component hijacking
is the target component in the callee app being exported, an
Android terminology that describes a component is exposed
to other apps on the same phone. The attack component
in the caller app then can send a crafted IPC (inter-process
communication)2 request to the exported component, to ma-
liciously trigger its code execution for a privileged operation,
e.g., permission misuse [39] and data manipulation [44]. In
this sense, component hijacking belongs to the classic con-
fused deputy problem [40].
More specifically, we underline two in-scope threats that
are not considered in some related works.
• Unlike [39, 64, 60], we do not assume that exported
components protected with above-normal3 permissions
are always safe. Because for an exported component
protected with an dangerous-level permission, an at-
tack app still can register the corresponding permission
for sending IPC requests. Additionally, a recent re-
port [19] showed that even components with a signa-
ture-level permission could be compromised, because
the attack app can pre-claim that permission as nor-
mal if it is installed earlier than the victim app.
• Similarly, for the attack app, we do not assume it al-
ways has zero or few permissions. Indeed, it can claim
the same permission as the misused permission in a
victim app. The benefit for doing so is that it may de-
ceive the IPC call chain-based permission checking [38,
34]. On the other hand, we do assume that the attack
app has no root privilege, which is reasonable and a
widely adopted practice in Android research.
It is worth noting that a related threat called unautho-
rized Intent receipt [32] is out of the scope of this paper.
This threat is essentially different from component hijack-
ing. In its model, the attack app is the callee, and vulnera-
bility occurs because the caller victim app mistakenly sends
out sensitive information in its IPC messages. A systematic
defense [47] has been proposed to mitigate this issue.
3. SecComp: SECURECOMPONENTLIBRARY
3.1 Overview
2In some references, this kind of IPC is also called ICC (inter-
component communication) [50] or inter-app communication. In
this paper, we unify these terms using IPC.
3There are four levels of Android permissions [20]: normal, dan-
gerous, signature, and signatureOrSystem.
Victim callee app 
SecComp 
Exported component 
EP-AC SP-AC 
Entry 
Point 
Sink Original  
IPC flow 
Point 
MAC policies 
Custom policies Alert boxes 
(optional) 
Enforcement 
Primitives 
Access 
Control 
Decisions 
Sink 
APIs 
Entry 
Functions 
Figure 2: The overall design of SecComp. It involves
these major designs: (§3.2) identifying which entry func-
tions and sink APIs to instrument; (§3.3) performing
code instrumentation to insert entry and sink points,
which route incoming IPC flows to SecComp for access
control; (§3.4) extracting enforcement primitives that
are used in policy design; and most importantly, (§3.5)
enforcing the mandatory entry-point access control (i.e.,
EP-AC) and the optional sink-point access control (i.e.,
SP-AC). Finally in §3.6, we discuss how to deploy Sec-
Comp in the wild.
Figure 2 presents the overall design of SecComp, a secure
component library for performing in-app mandatory access
control on behalf of app components.
SecComp supports two kinds of enforcements, i.e., entry-
point access control (EP-AC) and sink-point access control
(SP-AC). EP-AC is enforced just after the entry of an app
component, whereas SP-AC is performed just before each
sensitive API call (i.e., the so-called sink, a term commonly
used in taint analysis [24]). EP-AC serves as the first line
of defense, so every incoming IPC request will be checked
by this module. As to be illustrated in §3.5, we design a set
of mandatory access control policies for EP-AC to confine
common attacks and mistakes. Only IPC requests that EP-
AC cannot determine legal or not will be further assessed
by SP-AC, at the point a sink API going to be executed.
To guarantee the completeness, we launch user-driven access
control in SP-AC to handle cases with no fixed patterns.
To route incoming IPC flows to SecComp for access con-
trol, we pre-insert entry-point and sink-point instrumenta-
tion points into original app component codes. These instru-
mentation points are very lightweight—only one or two lines
of codes each. After SecComp’s checking, we either return
the execution flow back to the component codes (if the IPC
request is legal) or terminate it (if the request is non-legal).
For cases that user decisions are required, we hold on the
execution flow and wait for users to make a decision via a
pop-up dialog.
3.2 Identifying Entry Functions and Sink APIs
Entry function identification. Table 1 characterizes the
component entry functions that need to be intercepted by
SecComp. We organize them by different component types
2
Table 1: Component entry functions that need to be intercepted, characterized by component types and IPC caller APIs.
Component types IPC caller APIs† Interested entry functions†of IPC callee components
Activity [1]
Context[9].startActivity()
onCreate(Bundle); onStart(); onNewIntent(Intent)
Activity.startActivityForResult()
Service [17]
Context.startService() onCreate(); onStartCommand(Intent, int, int)‡
Context.bindService() onCreate(); onBind(Intent); onRebind(Intent)
BroadcastReceiver [5]
Context.sendBroadcast()
onReceive(Context, Intent)
Context.sendOrderedBroadcast()
ContentProvider [7]
ContentResolver[8].query() query(Uri, String[], String, String[], String)
ContentResolver.insert() insert(Uri, ContentValues)
ContentResolver.bulkInsert() bulkInsert(Uri, ContentValues[])
ContentResolver.update() update(Uri, ContentValues, String, String[])
ContentResolver.delete() delete(Uri, String, String[])
ContentResolver.openFileDescriptor() openFile(Uri, String)
† For simplicity, we skip the parameters of caller APIs and the class names of entry functions.
‡ An old-SDK version of onStartCommand(Intent, int, int) is onStart(Intent, int), which should be also covered.
and IPC caller APIs, and explain them as follows (in the
reverse order of component types):
ContentProvider [7]: Identifying entry functions for Con-
tentProvider, the only non-Intent based component
among all four types, is straightforward. Because there
is a one-to-one mapping between each caller API and
entry function. For example, if an attack app calls the
ContentResolver.query API, the corresponding Con-
tentProvider.query entry function in a victim com-
ponent will be activated.
BroadcastReceiver [5]: There is only one entry for Broad-
castReceiver, namely the onReceive callback func-
tion. An adversary can call the sendBroadcast API
to trigger onReceive. Other IPC call APIs that are
built upon sendBroadcast could be also used, such
as sendOrderedBroadcast and sendStickyBroadcast.
All these calls lead to the execution of onReceive in a
callee component.
Service [17]: There are two ways to call a Service compo-
nent, either by starting it via the startService API,
or by binding it via the bindService API. Both cases
will first go through the onCreate() entry function if
the service is not created. The onStartCommand entry
(in the first case) operates in a way similar to the onRe-
ceive function, whereas the onBind or onRebind entry
(in the second case) only returns a Binder [3] object
and has no further sequential execution. Indeed, with
the retrieved Binder object, an adversary can invoke
any IPC interface functions [4, 2] that are pre-defined
by the Binder object. These custom interface func-
tions thus become additional Service entries, which
should be also instrumented.
Activity [1]: Similar to Service, the entry functions of Ac-
tivity also include onCreate and onStart, which could
be activated by the startActivity() API and its vari-
ants. Additionally, there is a special entry function in
Activity, i.e., onNewIntent. This entry would be trig-
gered if the caller app sets a special Intent flag called
FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP.
Sink API selection. To pick sink APIs that are relevant
to component hijacking, we can leverage some earlier works.
Notably, Stowaway [37] and PScout [25] released a list of
permission-protected APIs, and SuSi [52] leveraged super-
vised learning to output a large set of privacy-related APIs.
These results are very useful, but still need manual efforts
to form a hijacking-specific API set. On the other hand,
1 public void onReceive(Context cxt , Intent intent) {
2 + if (! SecReceiver.receive(cxt , intent))
3 + return;
4 // Original code
5 }
Listing 1: Instrumenting BroadcastReceiver’s onReceive,
an example of the basic EP-AC instrumentation.
works for detecting component hijacking issues [39, 44, 64]
described the sink APIs that are specific to their problems
or component types. Our earlier effort [60] tried to synthe-
size these results and has released a preliminary dataset [21].
In the future, we plan to further collaborate with the open
source community to build a comprehensive dataset.
3.3 Instrumenting Entry and Sink Points
After identifying entry functions and sink APIs, we per-
form code instrumentation to insert entry and sink points.
To pack the instrumentation codes, SecComp defines four
static Java classes, namely SecActivity, SecService, Se-
cReceiver, and SecProvider. We find that there are two
types of EP-AC instrumentation and one kind of SP-AC
instrumentation:
1. Basic EP-AC Instrumentation: Most of EP-AC
instrumentation just add two lines of codes in the pro-
logue of entry functions. They intercept original en-
try parameters and a few context parameters to Sec-
Comp for decision making. Listing 1 shows the exam-
ple of instrumenting BroadcastReceiver’s onReceive.
It simply delivers the original Context and Intent pa-
rameters to SecReceiver’s receive function for access
control (line 2). If the access is not allowed by poli-
cies, the instrumentation code returns without giving
the control flow back to original code (line 3). In most
cases, we need to intercept additional parameters such
as component Context, from which SecComp then can
extract component identity and attribute for policy en-
forcement. To obtain the Context, we deliver a this
variable to EP-AC instrumentation. Moreover, to in-
tercept the incoming Intent for Activity, we invoke
the getIntent() API to explicitly obtain its value.
2. EP-AC instrumentation for bound services: As
mentioned earlier, we should treat Binder interface
functions as individual entries. Therefore, for a bound
Service such as RemoteService [2] in Listing 2, we
3
1 public class RemoteService extends Service {
2 public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) {
3 + if (! SecService.bind(this , intent))
4 + return null;
5 return mBinder;
6 }
7 private final IRemoteService.Stub mBinder = new
IRemoteService.Stub() {
8 public int getPid () {
9 + if (! SecService.rpc(this ,"getPid",null))
10 + return null;
11 return Process.myPid();
12 }
13 };
14 }
Listing 2: The special EP-AC instrumentation for a
bound Service named RemoteService [2]. It instruments
onBind as usual, and further instruments Binder interface
functions (getPid here) as for ContentProvider’s entries.
1 public void onStart(Intent intent , int startId) {
2 String num = intent.getStringExtra("phone");
3 String text = getRandomString (8);
4 SmsManager SM = SmsManager.getDefault ();
5
6 + if (! SecSink.check(this , "sendTextMessage", new
Object []{num , null , text , null , null}))
7 + return;
8 SM.sendTextMessage(num , null , text , null , null);
9 }
Listing 3: An example of SP-AC instrumentation for a
vulnerable Service component in Go SMS Pro [10]. The
full vulnerablity and exploit codes are available in [6].
instrument not only its onBind as usual, but also the
getPid function in a way similar to how we instrument
ContentProvider’s entries.
3. SP-AC instrumentation: It intercepts both API
names and parameters, and delivers them to the user-
driven access control module (§3.5.2) for output. List-
ing 3 shows a sample SP-AC instrumentation for the
popular Go SMS Pro app [10], which was vulnerable to
the SEND_SMS permission leak [6]. At line 6, SecComp
records the sendTextMessage call and its five param-
eters, along with the this variable for capturing the
component context.
3.4 Extracting Enforcement Primitives
As an in-app defense, SecComp can collect a set of valu-
able enforcement primitives that will be used in the policy
enforcement:
App identity: We extract the identity information of both
caller and callee apps for policy making. We use pack-
age name (e.g., com.whatsapp for WhatsApp) instead
of app UID to represent an app identity, because some
apps (e.g., Chrome) may have multiple UIDs. We fur-
ther combine app signatures to determine whether two
apps are from the same developer. In this paper, we
uniformly denote these identity information by Ida and
Idv, which represent the caller and the callee identity,
respectively. Then, Ida 6= Idv represents that an in-
coming IPC request is from a third-party app.
Component attribute: Android apps claim different com-
ponent attributes in the manifest file, i.e., AndroidMan-
ifest.xml. We denote these attributes by XxxAttr,
such as ExportedAttr for the “exported” attribute,
PermAttr for the permission attribute, and ActionAttr
for the Intent actions registered by components. Ad-
ditionally, we denote system-defined permissions and
actions by SysPerms and SysActions, respectively.
A list of permissions and actions that are defined by
Android is available in [15, 18]. If a permission can
be claimed only by system or an action can be sent
only by system, we denote them by SysOnlyPerm and
SysOnlyAction, respectively.
Entry-point input data: Likewise, we denote different in-
put values by InputXxx. For example, the incoming
Intent action is represented as InputAction, and the
incoming data Uri is denoted by InputUri.
Sink-point parameters: We denote a sink API parameter
by SinkPara. This primitive is used only by SP-AC.
In particular, we will detail how to collect app identity
and component attributes in §4.2. The input data and sink
parameters can be obtained through the entry-point and
sink-point instrumentation codes (see Listing 1 and 3).
3.5 Enforcing In-App Access Control
3.5.1 MAC Policies for EP-AC
We find that it is possible to devise mandatory access con-
trol (MAC) policies to stop common component hijacking
issues. These issues arise because of system flaws or devel-
oper mistakes. We study their root causes and design the
corresponding MAC policies for EP-AC to enforce. Table 2
lists six representative MAC policies (P1 to P6) we have de-
signed. From a high-level view, policies P1 to P3 patch the
system weaknesses, P4 and P5 mitigate common developer
mistakes, and P6 filters a common attack.
A common point among all six policies is that we treat
the IPC requests initiated from the same app or developer
trusted. That is, only an external IPC request from a third-
party app will be checked. This is denoted by Ida 6= Idv, as
mentioned in §3.4. However, an experienced adversary may
bypass this policy by detouring IPC requests first to another
component in the victim app. We propose to mitigate this
problem by adding a flag during each IPC relay so that Sec-
Comp can infer the origin of an IPC call chain. For example,
we can add one line of code, intent.putExtra(‘seclibflag’,
‘outside’), into each SP-AC instrumentation that contains
IPC call functions.
The policy P1 is derived from a system flaw [19] that
an attack app who installed earlier can pre-claim a custom
permission in the victim app, such as setting its permission
level from signature to normal. Consequently, the attack
app can hijack any component that was originally protected
with signature-level permissions. Based on this root cause,
our policy first determines whether there is a custom permis-
sion defined in the callee component, i.e., ∃(PermAttrv /∈
SysPerms). If there is a such custom permission, we fur-
ther check whether or not it has been pre-claimed by the
caller app, i.e., PermAttrv = PermAttra. If yes, we deny
the request to prevent a component hijacking attack.
The policy P2 and P3 aim to mitigate the gap that com-
ponents could be by default exported by system whereas
developers may not be aware of that. Specifically, compo-
nents that define Intent Filters are implicitly exported [11]
even if they do not claim the “exported” attribute. Fur-
thermore, ContentProvider components are automatically
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Table 2: MAC policies for EP-AC. Here we list six representative policies (P1 to P6) we have designed.
ID Policy Name † Policy Representation
P1 No Pre-claimed Custom Permission All if Ida 6= Idv ∧ ∃(PermAttrv /∈ SysPerms) ∧ PermAttrv = PermAttra: deny
P2 No By-default Exported Provider P if Ida 6= Idv ∧ ¬ExportedAttr: deny
P3
No By-default Exported Component
A,S,B if Ida 6= Idv ∧ ¬ExportedAttr ∧ ActionAttr /∈ SysActions : denyfor Custom Intent Action
P4 Checking System-only Broadcasts B if Ida 6= Idv ∧ ∃(ActionAttr ∈ SysActions) ∧ InputAction 6= ActionAttr: deny
P5 Stopping DoS (Denial-of-Service) All if Ida 6= Idv ∧ CrashNum ≥ Threshold: deny
P6 Filtering Sql Injection for Provider P if Ida 6= Idv ∧ ∃(AttackStr ∈ InputPara): deny
† This column lists which components this policy is applicable for. The five symbols are explained as follows.
All: all four components; A: Activity; S: Service; B: BroadcastReceiver; P: ContentProvider.
exported unless developers explicitly assign “false” to the
“exported” attribute. This by-default rule led to thousands
of vulnerable ContentProvider components [64]. Although
Google later revised this rule since Android 4.2, it still re-
quires developers to manually update apps’ SDK attributes
to a safe version. According to a very recent study [45], there
are still many by-exported ContentProvider components.
To protect by-default exported component from hijacking,
policy P2 and P3 first determine whether there exists the
“exported” attribute. For ContentProvider, we can deny
the IPC request if there is no “exported” attribute, in order
to mimic the current system rule. For other components, we
further check what kinds of Intent actions are registered.
Only for those custom actions (ActionAttr /∈ SysActions),
the corresponding IPC requests will be denied. Addition-
ally, we will provide a debug mode with user interfaces, to
help developers resolve the potential (but less likely) conflict
between their original intentions and our policies.
Following P3, we further propose the policy P4 to han-
dle the case of system actions. In particular, a compo-
nent listening to system-only broadcasts is hijack-able if
it does not check the incoming Intent action explicitly in
the code. A prior work [60] showed that there are around
150 system-only broadcasts on Android. To prevent com-
ponent hijacking due to missed action checks, P4 automat-
ically checks the input action against the system-only ac-
tion claimed in manifest, i.e., ∃(ActionAttr ∈ SysAction) ∧
InputAction 6= ActionAttr.
The policy P5 aims to mitigate the denial-of-service hi-
jacking due to missed null checks on IPC input. This is a
common mistake that affected a large portion of Android
apps, according to a previous empirical study [35]. To stop
such hijacking, we record the app crash times correspond-
ing to each caller app. And if it has exceeded the thresh-
old value (e.g., 3 times), SecComp then denies the request.
Moreover, we can consider only the recent crashes to avoid
over-checking.
Finally, we propose the policy P6 to filter SQL injection
for ContentProvider. As demonstrated in [64], an attack
app can hijack a provider component to inject malicious SQL
statements. For example, the adversary sets the projection
parameter of the query function as a special phase “* from
private_table;”. Since these special inputs are usually dif-
ferent from normal queries, we thus can use keyword-based
filtering (such as the keyword “;”) to stop them.
3.5.2 User-driven Control for SP-AC
For IPC requests that cannot be determined by EP-AC,
we further launch the user-driven control when they are go-
ing to arrive at a sink point. Basically, SecComp pops out an
alert dialog interface and asks users to make a decision. Fig-
Figure 3: An UI example of user-driven control.
ure 3 shows a sample alert box that we have implemented.
By collecting all the enforcement primitives in §3.4, we can
provide sufficient context information to help users choose
“Deny” or “Allow”. We plan to also leverage recent advances
on usable security [57, 23, 53] to make SecComp’s user-
driven control more accessible to end users. Furthermore,
we allow developers to revise each individual pop-up dialog
through SecComp’s debugging mode. They can even draft
custom policies to black- or white-list certain sink points.
It is also possible to derive MAC policies for SP-AC, al-
though we currently use the user-driven control scheme. One
potential MAC policy is to deny all background sink access
(initiated from a third-party app) when users are not using
their phones. The policy P6 in Table 2 could be also evolved
to a sink-point version, i.e., preventing SQL injection for
database sink APIs in all components. Moreover, we may
leverage the IPC call chain-based permission checking [38,
34] to perform mandatory access control. For instance, if
the caller app has no SEND_SMS permission, it should be also
denied to access a component that has such permission. In
practice, this kind of MAC needs more careful design to
minimize the negative impact to normal functionalities. For
example, it is legal for a file management app (with zero
permission) to instruct the Dropbox app to upload a file.
3.5.3 Towards Fine-grained Custom Policies
As both EP-AC and SP-AC policies are general-purpose
and made by us, there is a need for individual developer to
craft app-specific policies for more fine-grained access con-
trol. We plan to support such custom policies in SecComp,
which enables new use cases. We introduce two cases below:
Whitelist and blacklist: Developers can write custom poli-
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cies to support whitelist and blacklist based access con-
trol. For example, they can specify App A is allowed to
access my Component C. This is in particular useful to
big vendors that own several development teams with
each using different app signature. By using whitelist,
apps made by different teams can still easily collabo-
rate with one another.
Policy update and hotfix: Using custom policies allows de-
velopers to update their policies on-the-fly, such as
pushing hotfixes to protect their apps from being ex-
ploited by a newly identified system flaw.
3.6 Deploying SecComp in the Wild
The lightweight nature and requiring no OS change make
SecComp have a great potential to be deployed in the wild.
The primary SecComp users are app developers. They are
free to choose any of the following two deployment models:
Selective SecComp planting: Developers can selectively plant
SecComp to protect particular components that are
more likely to be attacked. Specifically, developers im-
port the SecComp jar file as like using other third-
party libraries. Once imported, they can selectively
add the instrumentation codes as in §3.3.
Automatic SecComp planting: To further minimize develop-
ers’ efforts, we are on the way of implementing a code
rewriting technique to automatically plant SecComp.
It can be a standalone script tool or a plugin integrated
in Eclipse and Android Studio. The basic workflow is
like this. By default, it locates the entry functions
of each exported component and inserts the EP-AC
codes. Optionally, developers could further instruct
this tool to perform control flow analysis to identify
reachable sink APIs and adds SP-AC.
Besides app developers, end users can directly use Sec-
Comp by incorporating the recent advance of app sandbox-
ing called Boxify [27].
4. IMPLEMENTINGASecComp PROTOTYPE
We have implemented a SecComp prototype for Content-
Provider components, i.e., SecProvider. We choose Con-
tentProvider as the first implementation choice because
only this type of components has no known defense pro-
posal. Implementing SecComp for other three components
is generally similar and also underway. In the course of im-
plementing SecProvider, we have identified and overcame
two main challenges: (§4.1) how to achieve user-driven con-
trol for background components such as ContentProvider;
(§4.2) how to extract app identity and component attributes
within the context of different Android components. In par-
ticular, we have developed a novel UI (user interface) tran-
sition technique to overcome the first challenge.
4.1 Achieving User-driven Access Control
To achieve user-driven access control, we need to pop out
an alert box as in Figure 3. However, we find that this is
a non-trivial task for ContentProvider components. Be-
cause ContentProvider is the only type of components that
retrieves a caller app’s Context object instead of a callee
app’s [9]. As it is forbidden to display one app’s UI elements
using another app’s Context, SecComp cannot properly pop
out an alert box for ContentProvider.
We take a different strategy to address this problem. In-
stead of directly displaying an alert box on top of a caller
app, we initialize a dialog-like Activity and use the caller
app’s Context object to launch this alert Activity via the
startActivity() API. It is worth noting that launching Ac-
tivity components from ContentProvider requires to set a
special Intent flag called FLAG_ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK. Besides
popping out a dialog-like Activity, we also need a method
to automatically return to the original caller UI after users
click alert box buttons. This is quite important for maintain-
ing user experience. A trivial solution is to invoke the star-
tActivity again with the caller component as the target.
We find a more efficient way. By setting one more special
Intent flag called FLAG_ACTIVITY_MULTIPLE_TASK, our alert
Activity can naturally go back to the caller UI after invok-
ing the Activity.finish() API. Moreover, we set the third
Intent flag called FLAG_ACTIVITY_EXCLUDE_FROM_RECENTS
to avoid the alert box appear in the history of recent Ac-
tivity components.
After successfully launching the alert dialog in Content-
Provider, we need a mechanism to pause the current com-
ponent execution and wait for users’ decisions. To do so,
SecComp initializes a lock object and sets this object into
the “wait” status after invoking the startActivity. Once
users click the buttons, the alert Activity will notify the
“waited” lock object to be released. Consequently, the lock
object will no longer wait and the paused ContentProvider
component resumes its execution. To avoid the unnecessary
long-time waiting, we further set a timeout value (e.g., 30
seconds in our current prototype). Even if users do not make
decisions after the timeout value, SecComp will by default
deny the access.
4.2 Extracting App Identity and Component
Attributes
We now present the implementation of the enforcement
primitive extraction as previously shown in §3.4. Among the
four types of primitives, obtaining entry-point input data
and sink-point parameters are straightforward via our in-
strumentation code in Listing 1 and 3. Therefore, we focus
on how to extract app identity and component attributes.
App identity extraction. To extract the package name
of a caller app, we can use the getCallingPackage() API.
However, this API is only available since Android 4.4 for
ContentProvider. To maintain the compatibility of Sec-
Comp, we opt to a generic way. We first extract the caller
UID via Binder.getCallingUid() and then use the UID to
retrieve the caller package. Meantime, the callee app pack-
age can be directly retrieved from ApplicationInfo, which
is available through Context.getApplicationInfo().
Component attribute extraction. To illustrate com-
ponent attribute extraction, we use the ExportedAttr as a
representative example. It aims to determine the export
status of a callee component, i.e., explicitly or implicitly ex-
ported. Unfortunately, this is non-trivial. Initially, we try to
obtain the status via the ProviderInfo.exported flag. But
we find that Android has already set this flag to true even
for those implicitly exported components. Consequently, it
is impossible to determine the real export status according
to the exported flag.
Without the Android API support, we have to seek an-
other way to obtain the component export status. Our so-
lution is to retrieve the whole AndroidManifest.xml file of
the callee app and parse the export status from that. More
specifically, if our parser does not encounter the exported
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attribute, we determine the corresponding component is im-
plicitly exported.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Security Evaluation
We now evaluate the effectiveness of SecComp against dif-
ferent hijacking attacks in ContentProvider. We use the
open source Zirco Browser [22] as our evaluation subject. It
has the following two ContentProvider components, the ex-
plicitly exported WeaveContentProvider and the implicitly
exported ZircoBookmarksContentProvider.
<provider android:name=".providers.
WeaveContentProvider" android:authorities="
org.zirco.providers.weavecontentprovider"
android:exported="true"/>
<provider android:name=".providers.
ZircoBookmarksContentProvider" android:
authorities="org.zirco.providers.
zircobookmarkscontentprovider"/>
Listing 4: The two exported ContentProvider components
in Zirco Browser.
We have implemented SecComp to defend against three
ContentProvider hijacking attacks: (i) the EEC attack
that exploits explicitly exported components, (ii) the IEC
attack that exploits implicitly exported components, and
(iii) the SQL attack that performs SQL injections at Con-
tentProvider components. More specifically, we leverage
the policy P2 and P6 (in Table 2) to stop the last two at-
tacks, and further extend the policy P2 as the following cus-
tom policy to defend against the EEC attack.
ifIda 6= Idv ∧ ExportedAttr = true : alert
Defending the EEC attack. We use WeaveContent-
Provider to evaluate SecComp against the EEC attack. As
shown in Figure 4(a), without SecComp, an adversary can
access all information from the weave.db database when our
library is not included into the Zirco Browser. After Sec-
Comp is included in the Zirco Browser, it will pop out an
alert dialog for users to do control (see Figure 3). When
users select the “Deny” button, no information could be ac-
cessed from the WeaveContentProvider, as shown in Fig-
ure 4(b).
Defending the IEC attack. We use ZircoBookmarksCon-
tentProvider to evaluate SecComp against the IEC attack.
As shown in Figure 5(a), an adversary can access all informa-
tion from the bookmarks.db database when SecComp is not
included into the Zirco Browser. After including SecComp,
as shown in Figure 5(b), it will directly deny IPC requests
from other apps. As a result, no information of ZircoBook-
marksContentProvider could be leaked any more.
Defending the SQL attack. We still use WeaveCon-
tentProvider to evaluate SecComp against the SQL attack.
This time the adversary sets the projection parameter as
a special phase “* from private_table”, which can launch
the SQL injection. But SecComp can directly defend against
such malicious behaviors, as shown in Figure 6.
Self protection. The adversary may exploit the fact that
SecComp for stopping the EEC attack pops out an alert
dialog to launch the GUI-based denial-of-service attack. To
prevent such attack, we can provide users a choice button
called “Remember my decision” so that next time no alert
(a) No SecComp. (b) With SecComp.
Figure 4: Defending the EEC attack.
(a) No SecComp. (b) With SecComp.
Figure 5: Defending the IEC attack.
dialog will be popped out. We also can set a threshold value
that defines how many alert dialogs could be popped out
within a time slot.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
We further evaluate the overhead introduced by SecComp.
To this end, we record the execution time of SecComp under
different operations. It is worth noting that for measuring
the overhead of defending the EEC attack, we temporar-
ily remove the lock wait code. Because user decision time
should not be included as our overhead.
Table 3 shows the overhead results. We can see that the
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Figure 6: Defending the SQL attack.
Table 3: The overhead introduced by SecComp.
Overhead
(mean, 95% confidence interval)
Defending the SQL attack 0.009± 0.001 ms
Normal component operation 0.250± 0.015 ms
Defending the IEC attack 0.306± 0.063 ms
Defending the EEC attack 229.417± 45.336 ms
overhead of defending the SQL attack is the smallest, only
requiring 0.008–0.010ms with the 95% confidence interval.
This is because SecComp only needs to check whether in-
put data contains malicious strings for defending the SQL
attack. The overhead of normal component operation is the
second smallest, requiring only 0.235–0.265ms. This is be-
cause we only add one more checking at this step, i.e., to
check the caller app identity. We further add the compo-
nent semantic checking to defend against the IEC attack,
the overhead of which is 0.243–0.369ms. As the overhead
of all these three operations is under 0.5ms, we conclude
that their overhead is very low. The overhead of defending
EEC attack is the largest, requiring around 200ms, because
launching an alert Activity is a bit expensive. But since
it is finished within 0.5s, we believe that this is still a low
overhead.
6. RELATEDWORK
Many works have been conducted to mitigate component
hijacking on Android or secure cross-app communication in
general. Most of them [51, 38, 34, 29, 30, 28, 42, 54, 31,
26, 55, 46] aim to evolve Android’s security architecture by
introducing fine-grained, mandatory, and extensible access
control at different system levels.
A notable example is SEAndroid [54], which reconstructs
Android from the previous Linux UID-based discretionary
access control to the recent SELinux-enabled mandatory ac-
cess control. It can restrict certain app flaws such as direct
file leak [59, 58] but not component hijacking, because it is
quite challenging to efficiently audit every IPC at the sys-
tem level without affecting any normal app functionality.
Probably due to the same reason, Android IntentFirewall
is still an experimental feature [13, 14] despite its code re-
lease over three years ago [12]. Moreover, IntentFirewall is
a sender -oriented policy framework [41] and thus requires
the malicious Intent patterns. In contrast, SecComp has no
such requirement and can be applied to both Intent and non-
Intent based components. Additionally, Kantola et. al. [42]
made OS change to restrict component exposure. Although
this is effective to reduce attack surfaces, it is not flexible
and cannot handle some component hijacking attacks such
as those defended by our policy P1, P4, P5, and P6.
The other line of defense solutions is to perform app repack-
aging [61, 63, 43]. Notably, AppSealer [62] repackages apps
to generate component hijacking patches which performs the
sink-point enforcement. Aurasium [61] offers a similar capa-
bility although it is not specialized for component hijacking.
Our SP-AC is inspired by these works but not in a form of
repackaging.
As orthogonal to the defense research, many prior studies
try to understand and detect component hijacking issues in
real-world apps. They have leveraged program analysis tech-
niques to propose various detection systems, including Com-
Droid [32], Woodpecker [39], CHEX [44], ContentScope [64],
and Epicc [50]. Android app analysis frameworks, such as
FlowDroid [24] and Amandroid [56], could be also extended
to analyze component hijacking. Recently, more solid and
scalable inter-component analysis methods [49, 48] have also
been proposed.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORKS
In this paper, we presented our vision on practically de-
fending against component hijacking in Android apps. We
proposed SecComp, a secure component library for perform-
ing in-app mandatory access control on behalf of app com-
ponents. We further designed a set of generic and practical
policies for SecComp to enforce. We have implemented a
preliminary SecComp prototype and demonstrated its effi-
cacy and efficiency. We are on the way of implementing a
complete SecComp system, and will open source it soon so
that more hands could join to help real-world apps get rid
of component hijacking.
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